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Abstract 
This paper conceptually and empirically examines sourcing food aid, comparing the approaches 
promoted by the U.S. with those of the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU).  In 
the recipient country approach (RCA) promoted by the UN and the EU, Transaction Cost 
Economics (TCE) suggests that RCA provides faster aid with less transaction costs. In the donor 
country approach (DCA) practiced by the U.S., the Resource-Based View (RBV) suggests that 
the superior resources of a donor country assure higher quality, safer, and a plentiful food supply. 
Using a comparative case analysis with actual data provided by the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID), we provide evidence that RCA and DCA as practiced in 
reality are both sub-optimal. Improved sourcing and transportation options computed through 
quantitative methods can offer significant benefits over both approaches. We propose a 
contingency approach that reduces landed costs of food aid by giving governmental relief 
organizations more flexibility in RCA vs. DCA sourcing, which can be justified by Resource 
Dependency Theory (RDT). Our findings contribute to the decision-making and policy 
discussion about the efficiency of governmental food aid programs.  
 
Keywords: Humanitarian Logistics; Supply Chain Management; Resource-Based View; 
Resource-Dependency Theory; Transaction Cost Economics 
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Introduction 
While the number of undernourished people fell by 17 % in the past two decades, chronic hunger 
affected 842 million people worldwide between 2011 and 2013 (FAO 2013). In addition, recent 
increases in the frequency and magnitude of disasters have strained governmental and 
organizational resources that attempt to provide relief. The United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) responds to global food needs through its Food-For-Peace 
initiative (FFP). While USAID sources the food aid mostly from the U.S. agricultural markets, 
partner organizations such as private volunteer groups (e.g., American Red Cross, Save the 
Children Federation, CARE, OXFAM) or World Food Program (WFP), are responsible for the 
physical distribution of the goods (USAID 2012). Contrary to USAID’s approach, the European 
Union (EU) and United Nations (UN) food relief efforts promote local and regional procurement. 
Proponents of both approaches claim various benefits of their procurement and distribution 
strategies. Lack of comparative studies in the academic literature means that current decision-
makers may be selecting relief strategies based on intuition or political concerns rather than on 
the effectiveness of relief efforts.  
The purpose of this study is to examine which approach is more efficient in providing 
food aid to a disaster zone by using three sets of archival data: USAID’s emergency shipment 
data, Food and Agriculture (FAO) organization’s historical average crop producer data, and U.S. 
Bureau of Transportation Statistics reports. In this study, we refer to the USAID approach as the 
“Donor Country Approach” (DCA) and the UN/EU approach as the “Recipient Country 
Approach” (RCA). While the recent trend in global food aid is towards more flexible, mixed-
strategy approaches that utilizes both local and regional procurement (USAID 2012), no 
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academic study has yet examined which approach is more efficient. Based on actual USAID 
emergency food aid shipment data and published historical average crop producer prices data, 
quantitative decision-making tools are used to compare the two food aid sourcing strategies and 
also provide conceptual support for each.    
Traditional economic theories are utilized to justify examination of DCA and RCA. We 
find that the DCA can be partially explained by the Resource-Based View (RBV) (Conner and 
Prahalad 1996) where the donor country organization views itself as having a resource advantage 
that is not easily duplicated by other countries. These resources, including food, volunteers, 
money, and transportation, may be key to effective sourcing. In the context of government 
agencies which provide the majority of disaster relief, Wernerfelt (1984) argues that government 
contacts are also resources, and first-movers in this area can create competitive advantages.  A 
competitive reason given by USAID for providing aid is to create a market for the U.S.-grown 
agricultural goods (Long et al. 1995).  The RBV is a revenue-focused theory whereby higher 
rents can be earned through greater availability and quality of donor country food. The 
proposition that RBV explains the actions of donor countries is further supported by the fact that 
U.S. agricultural resources supply half of the global food relief (USAID/USDA 2012).  
On the other hand, the actions by governments that promote the RCA can be explained by 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) (Coase 1988). Here organizational behavior is driven by a 
desire to minimize information and coordination costs, and policing and enforcement costs of 
providing food relief. The application of TCE to governmental actions is in the literature 
(Williamson 1998; Shelenski and Klein 1995; Crocker and Masten 1996), but empirical 
examinations comparing them to alternative strategies are sparse.  
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Grounding the two relief aid sourcing approaches in RBV and TCE, we search for 
answers to the following research questions:  
RQ 1: Is the DCA or the RCA the more cost efficient food aid option? 
RQ 2: Is there an improved solution available that is more cost-efficient than the DCA or RCA? 
This study contributes to the literature by using theories and quantitative techniques to 
demonstrate that neither the pure DCA nor the pure RCA universally provide the best available 
solution to food relief aid. Instead, we show that their efficiencies are contingent and a case-by-
case analysis is needed to estimate which is more applicable given a specific relief scenario. This 
study contributes to governmental decision-making by providing a model where the USAID 
approach and the EU/UN approach can be evaluated in any relief aid situation.  
The paper is organized as follows: first we summarize the relevant arguments of both 
academics and practitioners in the disaster response field. Next, we model and compare the costs 
of the DCA to the RCA to estimate their relative efficacy on food delivery by using actual data 
provided by USAID and FAO. Then, we empirically test which sourcing option is more cost 
efficient under multiple transportation cost scenarios using data published by U.S. Bureau of 
Transportation Statistics International Trade Report (BTS 2014). Finally, we provide a 
theoretical explanation of the approaches and conclude by discussing the implications on 
governmental food aid decisions. 
 
Literature Review 
USAID is a U.S. governmental agency tasked with a mission to “end extreme global poverty and 
enable resilient, democratic societies to realize their potential” (www.usaid.gov). The agency’s 
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Office of Food for Peace (FFP) aims to address global food security by providing food aid to 
people affected by natural or man-made disasters. This aid can take the form of fast, emergency 
food relief meant to prevent immediate loss of life or health, or longer-term development food 
relief over a number of years. While the UN had been involved in relief efforts since World War 
II, the legislative framework for U.S. government’s international food aid started with the 
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act (PL-480) in 1954. As signed by President 
Eisenhower, the act’s primary purpose was to “lay the basis for a permanent expansion of our 
exports of agricultural products with lasting benefits to ourselves and peoples of other lands” 
(USAID 2009). In 1961, President Kennedy renamed PL-480 as “Food for Peace” (FFP) and 
steered the emphasis of the act towards more humanitarian goals. The economic goals of the 
program were simultaneously achieved by putting legal requirements to donate U.S.-grown food 
and ship them overseas by using U.S.-flagged vessels (also called “Cargo Preference”). These 
two goals - providing maximum food aid and using U.S. agricultural and transportation - often 
conflict with each other. Actually, two other big donors - EU and UN - promote a local/regional 
sourcing strategy that purports to be more efficient than USAID by supporting faster recovery to 
the disaster area. Recognizing the inefficiencies created by the constraints, the U.S. government 
decided to experiment with other forms of food aid, such as local and regional procurement of 
food commodities (2008 Farm Bill), cash transfers and food vouchers through the Emergency 
Food Security (ESP) Program. 
As a prominent member of the food relief supply chain (see Figure 1), USAID is the 
single largest food donor, providing over half of global food aid, (Atwood et al. 2008; Shapouri 
and Rosen 2004). The two major direct costs involved in providing food relief are procurement 
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costs and transportation costs. According to Falasca and Zobel (2011, p 152), “procurement 
activities account for 65% of the expenditures”. The U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics 
(International Trade Report 2013) estimates that international transportation costs range from 9% 
to over 20% of landed costs. Seeking a balance of these two costs will result in more food being 
made available to deal with the ever-increasing number of catastrophes.  
Although a number of studies have addressed the issue of goods and personnel allocation 
in humanitarian relief, there is a paucity of research that considers the procurement decision 
(Falasca and Zobel 2011) in conjunction with transportation. As highlighted in Figure 1, our 
study focuses on the upstream aspects of the food relief supply chain - specifically on sourcing 
food aid commodities. Day et al. (2012) categorize humanitarian relief efforts in five stages 
including - preplanning, initiation, ramp-up, steady-state, and termination (transformation). Our 
analysis covers the steady-state stage of the relief works when agencies can focus on cost 
efficiencies rather than responsiveness. Because this study focuses on the governmental decision-
making process, it examines procurement and transportation cost decisions from the food source 
(government donor) through the International agency (USAID) to the first International Non-
Governmental Organization (e.g., World Food program-WFP) which is typically responsible for 
downstream flow of the food to the aid recipients in the relief supply chain.  
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 Here 
------------------------------------------ 
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Relief Efforts 
A relief supply network is highly complex, (see Kovács and Spens 2007) and the interaction 
among its members is driven by multiple transactions. Oloruntoba and Gray (2006) use a more 
sequential model as depicted in Figure 1. Some studies that focus only on the final leg in the 
distribution of aid to recipients (Balcik et al. 2010), while others emphasize the big picture and 
focus on the supply chain network as a whole (Beamon & Balcik 2008). As reported by Taupiac 
(2001), humanitarian relief goods procurement is on the rise. While scientific research in 
organizational disaster relief has grown in the past two decades (Kunz and  Reiner 2012), out of 
247 articles in humanitarian disaster relief reviewed by Yu et el. (2014), only 9 were related to 
procurement (sourcing),  pointing to the need for more emphasis in the upstream stages of 
humanitarian supply chains.  
 
Donor Country versus Recipient Country Approaches (DCA vs. RCA) 
In the field of relief aid, both DCA and RCA have been commonly used. The EU and UN have 
historically promoted the RCA; although their representative governments did not always follow 
this approach. For example, in 2003, 60% of all UN relief aid went to Africa, but only 10% was 
sourced from there (Rienstra 2004). They argue that this creates an imbalance that slows 
economic recovery for the recipient countries and keep them aid dependent (WFP 2006; 
Hoffman et al. 1994). Responding to this imbalance, the UN passed a resolution encouraging 
RCA, including sourcing from developing countries with economies in transition (United 
Nations 2009). The resolution had marginal success, improving RCA from about 45% in 2004 to 
54% in 2008 (United Nations 2009). On the other hand, the U.S. government, while relaxing 
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restrictions somewhat, is still dominantly using DCA. Of the approximately $2 billion in U.S. 
food aid in 2011, only $232 million (11%) was dedicated to the RCA, as part of the Emergency 
Food Security (EFS) program which allows local and regional procurement as well as cash 
transfers and food vouchers (USAID, 2012).  
Conceptually there are numerous theories used to explain various logistics phenomena 
(Defee et al. 2010). However the vast majority is from other disciplines and rarely applied to 
humanitarian logistics (HL). Defee et al.(2010) argue that without more theory, the discipline 
can’t progress and mature. In fact, we found no organizational theories applied to HL at a 
strategic level in the Defee et al. (2010) paper. Therefore, using an expert panel, we borrow from 
organizational theory to provide support for the DCA, because it can be conceptually linked to 
the Resource-Based View (RBV) of the organization (Conner and Prahalad 1996) where the 
donor country organization views itself as having a resource advantage that is not easily 
duplicated. In the context of government, Wernerfelt (1984) argues that organizations should 
consider government contacts as resources, and says that first-movers in this area can create 
competitive advantages. In the case of food relief, it is not a direct competitive environment; 
however a competitive reason given by USAID for providing aid is to create a market for their 
home-grown agricultural goods (Long et al. 1995).  The RBV is a revenue-focused theory 
whereby higher rents can be earned on a premium resource, i.e. the availability and quality of 
donor country food.    
On the other hand, the actions by governments that promote the RCA (EU and UN) can 
be explained by Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) (Coase 1988), where organizational 
behavior is driven by a desire to minimize costs; in this case the cost of providing both food 
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relief and long-term disaster recovery. The UN approach proposes that the total cost of food aid 
is minimized by sourcing in the recipient country because transportation and procurement costs 
are less due to on-site or near-site sourcing (WFP 2006).  Unlike RBV, TCE is a cost-based 
approach that does not expressly consider behavior driven by future revenue from resources. 
However, the theories are not mutually exclusive when explaining the behaviour of 
organizations in disaster relief. A comparison shows that the two theories can be complimentary. 
For example, conceptually the RCA is related to the TCE’s promotion of the vertical integration 
of an organization where one entity controls the supply of goods to market, so RCA assumes that 
many of the benefits are driven by a recipient country’s ability to control the aid process as 
efficiently as a vertically-integrated organization. However, the recipient country can also 
provide aid locally that is superior to DCA, such as available food items that are climate 
sensitive such as corn and wheat. In this case, the activities of the relief organizations can be 
explained by RBV.  
In TCE costs are divided into three categories of, (i) Search and Information costs needed 
to coordinate resources that deliver aid to affected areas, (ii) Bargaining costs for purchasing 
goods and services, and (iii) Policing and Enforcement cost to ensure aid is provided according 
to the law and expectation of donors. The costs which are reduced through an RCA are the 
Information costs, and the Policing and Enforcement costs. TCE has been applied to explain 
several governmental activites and policies (i.e. Williamson 1998; Shelenski and Klein 1995; 
Crocker and Matsen 1996), but suffers from a lack of empirical examination in a governmental 
aid context. Trent and Monczka (2003) conceptually argues that all food relief procurement is 
generic and therefore requires limited product or supply chain expertise. RCA reduces more than 
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transaction costs by also reducing transportation costs (Brause 2009; Rienstra 2004) and also 
considers important cultural sensitivities such as tastes and preferences that may differ from the 
donor country (GAO 2009). This suggests that RBV may explain some of the recipient country 
activities where local contexts apply. For example, during the Bosnian war, Muslim populations 
didn’t eat some of the the distributed UN food aid because it contained pork. In Afghanistan, 
relief packets from donor countries containing peanut butter and jelly were sold in the black 
market because recipients were not familiar with their use (Filipov and Neuffer 2001). Similarly, 
in the context of enforcement costs, 35,000 tons of genetically-modified maize donated by the 
U.S. was rejected initially by the Zambian government and had to be milled as flour before last 
mile distribution (Tomasini and Van Wasenhove 2009). This supports the proposition that the 
enforcement costs could have been reduced through RCA because the local governments or 
relief organizations would better know the recipients’ sensitivities.  
However, sourcing close to the site of a disaster area that already relies on external 
support can be difficult. First, the local market might not have the resources to fill the large 
demand for food (Beresford and Pettit 2012; Care 2006). Second, the transportation 
infrastructure in the recipient country might be damaged (Beresford and Pettit 2012), and large 
bulk purchases by relief agencies and food shortages can drive local prices higher than those at 
the donor country (Carney 2012). Third, relief organizations must develop the resources to 
supply an aid network on the fly in the wake of an unpredictable catastrophe (Van Wassenhove 
2006). Fourth, recipient country information infrastructure may be damaged, and bargaining and 
sourcing from an unknown market may create opportunistic behaviour through exorbitant prices 
or poor quality. Unlike businesses that use historical data to judge and qualify a supplier, RCA 
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requires swift trust (Kotabe et al. 2003) because procurements are often short-term purchases 
providing little incentive for a long-term relationship.  Finally, to bargain and procure large 
quantities in RCA, key personnel are needed on-site. These factors can make sourcing in the 
recipient country challenging. 
The DCA also has some advantages. For example, donor country governments have 
intimate knowledge of their markets, suppliers, and transportation capabilities as well as the 
quality and prices of the commodities (Rienstra 2004). Since donor countries are mostly located 
in the industrialized world the resources they control have a higher level of predictability and 
stability not present in developing countries (Trautmann et al. 2009). Using DCA allows 
governments to exercise more control - capturing economies of scale and scope making the 
whole process less costly (Arnold 1999).  
Conceptually, the use of DCA can partially be explanined by the RBV (Conner and 
Prahalad 1996) where USAID views U.S.-grown food as a competitive advantage. The U.S. has 
only 4% of the world’s population, yet provides over 50% of world food aid (Atwood et al. 
2008; Shapouri and Rosen 2004). While countries do not directly compete for providing relief 
aid, as is suggested in a business application of the RBV, one objective of USAID is to promote 
markets for U.S. agricultural goods and U.S.-flagged vessels. Next, government funded agencies 
are sensitive to lobbying efforts in the donor country. For example, Voss (2009, p.8) reports that 
external stakeholders of the FFP program in the U.S. (e.g., farmers, shippers) have significantly 
influenced “the size and complexity of the program much to their own benefit” making donor 
country sourcing a more preferred option during budget appropriations in the national 
parliaments. Finally, introducing additional supplies into the recipient country during times of a 
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disaster can help avoid inflation and stabilize prices (GAO 2009). This literature supports the 
proposition that, in some contexts, the DCA may be a more efficient approach to food relief 
efforts. While Wernerfelt (1984) has previously discussed government relations in the context of 
RBV, to our knowledge, this is the first application of the RBV in relief aid. However, as 
discussed in the RCA section with RBV, TCE can be complimentary in explaining some 
behaviours of the donor country in that while located farther from the disaster, modern 
transportation technology owned by a donor country, such as aircrafts capable of precise air 
drops of aid, may be less expensive than trying to use the damaged infrastructure of a recipient 
country.    
 
Earmarking of Funds 
The earmarking of funds is a factor that influences the selection among DCA vs. RCA, as 
observed in USAID’s legal requirement to donate mostly U.S.-grown food commodities as 
international relief aid and transport those commodities by U.S.-flagged vessels. Earmarking is a 
budgeting tool used by politicians to reserve funding for specific projects that create political 
goodwill. In the foreign aid context, Adugna (2009) observes that earmarking takes place at two 
stages: (i) the sourcing stage (e.g., having to buy the food aid from the donor country market), 
and/or (ii) the using stage (e.g., funds dedicated to a specific project in the recipient country). 
The earmarking of USAID’s funds, in the context of this paper, takes place in the sourcing stage 
as per Adugna’s (2009) classification.  
Economists have often criticized earmarking for misallocating resources (McCleary 
1991; Minear and Weiss 1992). In the context of food relief, funds with strings attached cannot 
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be allocated optimally by relief organizations but must be used according to the donor country’s 
wishes (Barman 2008), resulting in 30% to 50% higher costs (Care 2006). Analyzing the impact 
of earmarking on humanitarian fleet efficiencies, Besiou et al. (2012) suggest that earmarking 
has negative consequences on DCA lead times and costs by preventing reallocation of vehicles to 
new disasters, and wasting resources. Due to the earmark on USAID funds, food and 
transportation are sequentially purchased from the U.S. through a bid process (Bagchi et al. 
2011; Trestrail et al. 2009). Consequently, lead times are long due to complex bureaucratic 
ordering cycles and the need to ship the food commodities overseas. Therefore, by current law 
USAID can’t fully practice RCA and one of the goals of this paper is to demonstrate the 
inefficiencies created by these earmarks. The literature conceptually supports both the RCA and 
DCA but does not provide empirical testing or examination of a possible better solution.  
 
Methodology 
The Model 
To increase the relevance of our comparison of DCA and RCA, we use a comparative case study 
with actual procurement costs of governmental food aid shipments to locations around the world. 
To estimate the cost of donor country sourcing, we first aggregated data for six perishable food 
commodities (lentils, beans, wheat, green peas, corn, and rice) and calculated the actual purchase 
costs of USAID's food aid shipments to five recipient countries (Rwanda, Ethiopia, El Salvador, 
Nicaragua and Bosnia Herzegovina). Then, we used historical commodity prices in the recipient 
countriess to calculate the cost of purchasing the same quantity/type of commodities if they were 
procured locally in the recipient country. The results were aggregated at commodity and country 
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levels and then compared to identify which approach is more efficient excluding the 
transportation costs. Next, we investigate the impact of transportation costs by generating three 
unique transportation scenarios – low ($15/MT), medium ($30/MT), and high ($75/MT). This 
was done not only to add transportation costs, but also to simulate the effect of the volatility in 
transportation prices due to fuel surcharges, and on-peak/premium demand charges worldwide.  
The first dataset in this study is USAID’s commodity transport (October 1993 - July 
2005) from Lake Charles / Louisiana warehouse which acts as the main prepositioning hub for 
USAID’s international food aid shipments. Information was available for 52 SKUs transported to 
69 countries. We narrowed down our focus on six of the most common food commodities 
(lentils, beans, wheat, green peas, corn, and rice) that dominated the relief aid shipments and five 
recipient countries (Rwanda, Ethiopia, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Bosnia Herzegovina). Our 
choice of recipient countries was based on two criteria: (i) diversity: representation from every 
continent, (ii) volume: countries with highest volume of shipment in a particular continent were 
picked up; both subject to the constraint of data availability. Eventually, we ended up with five 
countries from three continents. The shipment data were available in weight metric-tons (MT) 
and value ($ - U.S. Dollars). To compare the DCA procurement costs with possible RCA 
procurement costs, we supplemented USAID data with information by FAO - Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAOSTAT 2009). FAO provides historical average crop producer 
prices by country, in $/MT. In Table 1, average donor country (USAID) costs of commodities 
are listed next to the recipient country’s prices in $/MT. For example, “462/460” in the second 
column from the left for year 1995 shows that the price of beans was $462 in the recipient 
country (Rwanda) and $460 in the donor country (USAID’s purchase price) in that particular 
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year. While some countries in Asia (e.g., Iraq) also received USAID food aid shipments, we 
could not include them in our comparative analysis due to lack of local commodity price data.  
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 Here 
------------------------------------------ 
As transportation is a significant portion of total landed costs, we investigate the impact 
of different levels of transportation charges on USAID’s cost efficiency by adopting a scenario 
based approach. We scanned U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)’s monthly “Grain 
Transportation Reports” (www.ams.usda.gov/tmdtsb/grain) and the U.S. Bureau of 
Transportation Statistics (BTS) to compute the upper and lower bounds for long-distance grain 
freight rates from the U.S. Gulf. Fluctuations from $10 to $75 per MT in the 1995-2004 period 
were observed which were possibly caused by fuel surcharges, peak versus off-peak demand etc. 
Thus, we employ three transportation rate scenarios (see columns C, D and E of Table 2): 
$15/MT, $30/MT and $75/MT. $30/MT is an approximation of the average transportation rate in 
the 1995-2004 period. $15/MT is reflective of the relatively low cost at the end of 1998 through 
mid-2002. $75/MT represents the temporary hike observed early in 2004. Applying these 
transportation rates to the commodities in our dataset, we generate a total of four scenarios and 
compare the total costs (combination of purchase and transportation cost). Scenario 0, the base 
case, reflects the ratio of the DCA procurement cost to the RCA. Scenario 1 provides insights 
into total cost with relatively low shipping cost of $15/MT. Scenario 2 reflects average shipping 
cost of $30/MT and Scenario 3 higher shipping cost of US $75/MT. As this is a comparative 
study, our focus is not actually on the absolute cost figures but the relative differences between 
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RCA and DCA. Hence, the three-scenario approach allows us to get dynamic insights into the 
relationship between transportation cost variability and optimal choice (RCA vs. DCA). 
 
Interviews with Practitioners 
We provided a copy of this study to a panel of twenty-two practitioners and academics selected 
from universities, government, U.S. agriculture industry, aid volunteers, and NGOs. The profile 
of the panel is shown in Table 6. Eleven academics were selected from the U.S., Europe, South 
Africa, and China. First, the academics were asked to read the cases and submit ideas for 
alternative theories that may explain the RCA and the DCA, as well as the improved solution. 
Next, the results were shown to all participants and several rounds of Delphi were conducted 
until agreement was reached on inclusion of the RBV, TCE, and RDT theories.  In the last round 
of Delphi, each academic rated each theory against each scenario on a scale of “1” – “7”, with 
“1” representing no applicability of the theory to explain the scenario, and “7” representing a full 
explanation of the scenario by the theory.  Open comments are reported in the next section. 
Then, academics and practitioners were asked to evaluate the practicality of our improved 
scenario to real governmental food relief efforts. A score of “1” represents that the improved 
scenario has no practical application and is unlikely to be used by a governmental agency in food 
aid relief. A score of “7” represents that the improved solution could be applied in virtually all 
governmental food relief efforts worldwide.   
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Results 
Overall Analysis 
Comparative case results are provided in Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5. Using Ethiopia as an example in 
Table 2, USAID sent $24 million worth of lentils between 1995 and 2004 (column B). Had the 
lentils been purchased in the recipient country (Ethiopia), procurement costs would be $16.9 
million (column A). Similarly, wheat to Rwanda was purchased in the U.S. at a cost of $1.3 
million, significantly less than the estimated $4.5 million if procured in the recipient country 
(Rwandan) market. In columns C, D and E of Table 2, the transportation charges ($15/MT, 
$30/MT and $75/MT) are added to the USAID's purchase costs in Column B. For example, the 
lentils, including low shipping cost of $15/MT led to total cost of $25.4 million to Ethiopia. In 
Scenario 2 and 3, the costs are $26.7 million and $30.7 million respectively. 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 Here 
------------------------------------------ 
Next, in the right half of Table 2, we calculate the total cost ratios of procuring in the 
donor country versus the recipient country across four scenarios. Looking at Scenario 0 (column 
B/A), the base case with no shipping cost, we find that DCA is cheaper in the majority of 
country-commodity pairs, i.e. cost of beans in the donor country is 44% of those in Bosnia-
Herzegovina (Total Cost Ratio = Ratio of DCA cost to RCA cost of 0.44). Total Cost Ratios (to 
be called ratio in the rest of the paper) above 1.0 indicate it is cheaper to source from the 
recipient country, while ratios below 1.0 show that DCA is cheaper. For example, corn (Ratios – 
El Salvador: 0.53, Nicaragua: 0.85, Rwanda: 0.56) and wheat (Bosnia: 0.87, Ethiopia: 0.99, 
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Rwanda: 0.29) are procured cheaper in the donor country than recipient country. Beans cost less 
in the donor country (Bosnia: 0.44, El Salvador 0.71, Nicaragua: 0.63, Rwanda: 1.07). Rice (El 
Salvador 1.59 and Nicaragua: 1.65) and lentils (Ethiopia: 1.45) are more expensive to purchase 
in the donor country whereas green peas (Ethiopia: 1.06) are less expensive to purchase in 
recipient country.  
Scenario 1, transportation charge of $15/MT, gave mostly similar results to the base 
scenario. The only exception is the wheat in Ethiopia, which costs 8% more in DCA (Ratio of 
1.08) than in RCA when transportation cost is added at $15/MT to the DCA procurement costs. 
In Scenario 2, with an increase to $30/MT in transportation costs, we find the total cost of wheat 
for Bosnia-Herzegovina and corn for Nicaragua turn to be cheaper (3% and 6% respectively) 
compared to Scenarios 0 and 1. In Scenario 3, while the ratios increase in favor of RCA, 
interestingly, no significant change is observed relative to Scenario 2. In other words, increasing 
transportation cost from $30/MT to $75/MT does not change the optimal sourcing location (RCA 
or DCA) for any of the commodities in any recipient country. Overall, we observe that both 
country-characteristics and commodity-type impact the Total Cost Ratio between DCA and 
RCA. Answering RQ1, neither RCA nor DCA is uniformly better than the other. Next, we 
investigate systematic differences across countries. 
 
Country Level Analysis 
In Table 3, the data is aggregated across commodities to observe country-level cost 
(dis)advantages in the recipient country’s national market over the donor country market, 
including the varying transportation costs. With Total Cost Ratios below one, we find that in the 
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base scenario, sourcing food commodities from Bosnia-Herzegovina (Ratio of 0.66), El Salvador 
(0.81) and Rwanda (0.69) are more expensive than sourcing from the donor country; while 
sourcing food commodities locally in Ethiopia (1.01) and Nicaragua (1.20) will result in savings. 
These results are consistent at the $15/MT and $30/MT transportation rates of Scenarios 1 & 2 
respectively. Only in Scenario 3 (high transportation rate of $75/MT) is there a change in this 
pattern because sourcing from the recipient country of El Salvador is now 8% more efficient than 
sourcing in the donor country. Contrary to the recent trend in international food aid towards local 
and regional procurement, our results display no generalizable cost advantage for the RCA over 
the DCA. Answering RQ2, the improved solution is rather contingent in that for certain countries 
(Bosnia and Rwanda) sourcing from the donor country is more cost efficient, while in others 
(Nicaragua and Ethiopia) recipient country sourcing is always cheaper regardless of the variation 
in transportation rates. It is important to note that the tables are not designed for comparisons 
across countries, i.e. you can’t directly compare the results for Bosnia with those from Ethiopia, 
because the transportation rates differ for each location. The tables are designed to compare each 
scenario within a particular country at the transportation rates of $15, $30, and $75. Next, we 
compare RCA and DCA at the commodity level. 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3 Here 
------------------------------------------ 
Commodity Level Analysis 
Aggregating shipments across countries/regions (see Table 4) suggests that DCA (in the U.S. 
context) has a cost advantage for corn (Ratios ranging from 0.57 to 0.92), and beans (0.86 to 
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0.98) across all transportation scenarios. On the other hand, lentils (1.42 to 1.82), rice (1.65 to 
2.00) and green peas (1.06 to 1.25) are more economical to purchase in the recipient countries. 
The findings are less clear for wheat (0.97 to 1.42), which accounts for the largest volume of aid. 
In the base scenario with no transportation cost, wheat in the donor country is cheaper (2.7%). 
However, in Scenarios 1 to 3, the transportation charges significantly increase the cost (Ratios: 
1.06, 1.15, and 1.42) making the RCA less costly. International aid shipments incur 
transportation costs which makes the base Scenario 0 hypothetical. Hence, we could put the 
wheat in the same basket with lentils, rice and green peas for which RCA, on average, is more 
economical than DCA. Next, we aggregate across both commodities and countries to compare 
the RCA and DCA approaches. 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 4 Here 
------------------------------------------ 
Savings from Improved Sourcing Decisions 
Table 5 provides an overview of savings using contextual sourcing rather than pure RCA or 
DCA. Column A reports USAID's total procurement costs of all six commodities purchased as 
relief aid to the five recipient countries at different transportation rates. For example, as shown in 
column A, USAID spent over $360 million in the 1995-2004 period to purchase the six 
commodities sent to five recipient countries (Scenario 0). Looking at the last row of the same 
column, total costs increase to over $514 million when transportation costs are added at $75/MT. 
Column B shows that purchasing all the relief aid locally in the recipient countries would cost 
approximately $374 million. Comparing the total DCA-only and RCA-only costs in columns A 
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and B, we find that sourcing from recipient countries provide some savings over the DCA in all 
but the base scenario. 
In column C, we show the improved purchase decision scenario, in which the sourcing 
decision is made for each shipment, i.e., the donor could pick DCA or RCA purely based on cost 
efficiency. For example, if all commodities were procured in the lower-cost location, the total 
procurement cost of the base scenario would be $349 million, lower than either DCA-only ($360 
million) or RCA-only sourcing ($374 million). We find that with improved sourcing, the donor 
(USAID) could realize savings of 3.2% (column A/C). These savings increase with higher 
transportation rates. In the final scenario with transportation cost of $75/MT, USAID could 
realize cost efficiencies of 29.1% by reducing the total cost of $514 million down to $365 
million. Similarly, we find that this improved sourcing strategy still generates cost savings 
(ranging from 7.3% to 2.6% as depicted in the last column) when compared to the strategy of 
sourcing only in the recipient countries. Hence, we could say that the improved purchase 
decision results in cost savings compared to both DCA and RCA.  
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 5 Here 
------------------------------------------ 
Interview Results 
Table 6 reports the results of the ratings given by the twenty-two-person panel. Only the eleven 
academics were asked to review the theoretical section of the study, while all twenty-two raters 
were asked to rate the practicality of the improved solution. 
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------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 6 Here 
------------------------------------ 
The theoretical evaluation from all eleven academics supports the proposition that RBV 
explains a substantial portion of the behavior of the DCA in this study, reporting a mean of 
5.27/7.00. Comments from the raters indicated that the U.S. is arguably the most efficient food 
producer in the world while maintaining a high standard of quality and safe supply. This makes 
food a resource that gives the U.S. agricultural industry power domestically and internationally 
when it comes to food aid with economic benefits. However, as the donor countries change to 
those of the EU nations, China, Korea, or Japan the RBV may predict less of their behavior. 
These nations rely on substantial food imports therefore while a major driver of food aid from 
these nations may be to encourage exports or political good will, their behavior may require 
other theoretical contributions in addition to RBV.  
The academics had similar strong support for the TCE explaining RCA, with their scores 
also averaging 5.27/7.00. The weakest support came from the South African academic because 
she indicated that for the TCE to be considered as a strong theoretical contribution, a government 
responsible for controlling a RCA in their home country must behave in a similar manner as a 
vertically-integrated company. While TCE has been previously applied to governmental 
activities, the studies were conducted only on stable governments. She argues that in the case of 
a country with an unstable government, where aid is likely to be needed, TCE may not apply due 
to insufficient control of the food supply. With stable recipient country governments, TCE is 
more applicable. 
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Discussion  
In this study, we contrasted the costs of procuring and transporting food aid commodities from 
the donor country to a select number of recipient country markets (DCA) with the costs of 
purchasing those food commodities locally in the recipient countries (RCA).  Our findings show 
that neither DCA nor RCA provides the most efficient solution. The type of commodity, level of 
transaction costs, local market prices and transportation rates are all key determinants in efficient 
sourcing decisions. The DCA has a cost advantage for some commodities in our dataset such as 
corn and beans, while the RCA has an advantage in rice and lentils. Therefore, despite the 
USAID’s adoption of DCA and the UN/EU’s adoption of RCA, the improved solution is a 
combination of both approaches contingent on the ability of a country to maintain an information 
infrastructure, and police and enforce the movement of goods, as well as the availability of a 
commodity in a potentially resource-constrained environment. In cases where the DCA is more 
efficient or where there are no significant cost differences, sourcing from a known market with 
stable prices can provide additional benefits not captured in this study such as reduced search 
cost, and higher quality of food. However, when coordination costs are significantly cheaper in 
the recipient countries, sourcing from markets close to the affected area may reduce response 
time and provide some economic recovery for the recipient countries.  
While proximity of the recipient country to the donor country is an important factor 
influencing transportation rates, our analysis shows that varying transportation rates initially 
from $15/MT to $30/MT then to $75/MT surprisingly did not alter the direction of the Total Cost 
Ratios. Referring back to Table 4, we see that it makes more economic sense to source green 
peas, lentils and rice in the recipient countries at any of the three transportation rates. For wheat, 
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DCA is advantageous only if transportation is free as depicted in Scenario ‘0’ and for other three 
transportation cost scenarios; wheat is cheaper to buy in the recipient countries.  On the contrary, 
corn and beans are always cheaper to buy in the donor country even at the highest transport cost 
of $75/MT. Considering above-given findings, a characteristic of the commodity - annual 
production volume in the donor country - might play a role by influencing donor country 
commodity prices through presence/lack of scale economies. Referring to Table 4 (Scenario 0), 
the total cost ratio (DCA/RCA) is the greatest for Rice – 1.65 and lowest for corn - 0.57. 
Interestingly, while U.S. is only a minor rice producer, it is the top corn producer of the world 
(http://faostat.fao.org/). Overall, our findings show that some commodities are better sourced in 
the donor countries while others in the recipient countries, even under significant transportation 
cost variations. 
Sometimes a donor country might prefer to source all aid commodities in a single 
location to reduce transaction costs. Our country level analyses (Table 3) also prove to be quite 
robust against variations in transportation costs. Bosnia and Rwanda are relatively expensive 
sourcing locations and DCA makes more economic sense for sending aid to these countries at 
any transportation rate. On the other hand, Ethiopia and Nicaragua offer significant savings for 
RCA. The only location, that is somewhat sensitive to transportation rate variation, is El 
Salvador. As shown in the second row of Table 3, an increase in transportation rate from $30/MT 
to $75/MT pushes the country level ratio from 0.91 to 1.08, making RCA more economical only 
at high transportation rates in El Salvador.  
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Overall, we observe that our findings are not sensitive but robust across a wide range of 
transportation costs observed between 1995 and 2004. This robustness allows us to generalize 
our findings and recommend policymakers to use them. 
 
Theoretical Support for the Improved Solution by using Resource Dependence Theory  
This study shows that neither the RCA nor the DCA in response to disaster aid are optimally 
effective in all contexts, and vary across the type of relief provided and the location of the 
disaster region. Therefore, neither the RBV nor TCE alone adequately explains the behavior of 
either the recipient or donor countries. This is because in applying the improved solution to 
disaster relief, all organizations must depend on resources that originate from their own 
environment, whether internal or external to the organization.  This mixed relief solution can be 
explained by the Resource Dependency Theory (RDT) (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), which 
suggests that while internal resources are controlled by the firm, external resources are controlled 
by other organizations allowing them to exert some control over each other. 
RDT overlaps with the RBV as both theories propose that resources are the basis of 
organizational power. RDT links power and resource dependence, the more critical or rare a 
resource, the more power derived from it. This requires legally independent organizations, i.e. 
NGOs and governments, to therefore depend on each other to obtain the best results. In the 
context of food relief agencies, the RDT explains that a donor country government can provide 
food more efficiently by examining each relief project situationally and choosing the improved 
solution by adopting a contingency approach, whether DCA, RCA or a combination.  The benefit 
to the DCA is that more aid is delivered (output) for the same level of resource (input) thus 
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improving the marginal benefits derived from a donor country, translating into greater 
voter/constituent satisfaction in recipient countries. This creates mutual benefits and suggests 
that RDT could partially explain how benefits are derived for both parties in our improved 
solution, and the motivation for government agencies to implement it. This is supported by the 
expert panel (see Table 6).   
 
Implications 
Many DCA donations or countries are funded by public resources and are subject to constraints 
in their procurement and logistics policies similar to USAID. Our findings show that USAID's 
mandate to source the majority of its food relief aid domestically can result in significant supply 
chain cost inefficiencies. Hence, we recommend that USAID be given flexibility to decide on the 
sourcing location of U.S. international food aid. 
Recently, the U.S. administration seems to be more supportive of the RCA. For example, 
USAID’s Emergency Food Security Program (EFSP), launched in April 2010, received $232 
million funding in the fiscal year 2011, which gives the agency full flexibility to procure food aid 
locally/regionally, distribute cash or issue food vouchers to beneficiaries directly. In the FY 2015 
budget proposal, Obama Administration has recommended to further increase those flexible 
resources (USAID 2015). However, resistance against this partial bypass around the DCA is also 
building up. On April 1, 2014, the U.S. Congress passed the Coast Guard and Maritime 
Transportation Act of 2014 (Congress 2014), which increases the Cargo Preference for U.S. food 
aid programs to 75 % (from the current rate of 50 %). President Obama opposed the bill 
suggesting that this new threshold would increase the annual transportation costs of foreign food 
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aid by $75 million (Peterson 2014). Hence, this paper could contribute to the ongoing RCA vs. 
DCA debate in Washington DC by demonstrating the inefficiencies of earmarked donor funding. 
 
Conclusion 
This study makes significant contributions to the academic and practitioner literature in 
humanitarian supply chains. First of all, we show that for donor countries, there could be 
untapped potential in their supply chains to reduce procurement and transportation costs through 
RCA. While DCA results in higher procurement costs, considering both recipient country and 
donor country markets in the sourcing strategy will reduce costs. Second, our study is one of the 
first to empirically assess the cost structure of a relief organization's procurement policy. As 
concluded by Kovács and Spens (2011), lack of empirical research in relief aid due to 
unavailability of field data is a striking shortcoming in developing improved and practical 
solutions. Thus, we believe that, by using actual shipment data of USAID and matching it with 
the archival data of FAO, this paper makes a significant contribution to the literature as well. 
Our study empirically supports the research of Besiou et al. (2012), that while earmarking 
has been instrumental in continuation of governmental support, it also results in both 
misallocation of resources and inefficient aid delivery. Using a hybrid approach - sourcing both 
from the donor countries as well as recipient countries - provides the improved solution. In 
addition to being cost efficient, it allows donor countries to provide timely help while balancing 
the interests of the recipient countries. Otherwise, inefficiencies in these programs eventually 
translate into fewer people fed. Sourcing only in the donor countries’ commodity markets or 
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buying only in the recipient countries are both suboptimal solutions and have significant cost 
implications.  
Lastly, this study provides theoretical support for both the DCA and RCA using concepts 
derived from the RBV and TCE theories, as well as an improved approach that is partially 
explained by the RDT concept. While they are not mutually exclusive, these theories do explain 
unique characteristics of all food relief options explored in our study. To our knowledge, this is 
the first study to apply common empirical and costing techniques, and theories used in the 
operations literature to improve governmental relief efforts based on real sourcing and 
transportation data from actual relief efforts. 
 
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
While our scenario approach provides lower and upper boundaries of total costs, this study could 
further be enhanced by using actual transportation charges and transaction costs in calculations. 
Additional data could also be helpful in extending this study to other countries in Asia. 
Furthermore, donor countries also face the additional challenge of funding (short-term) 
warehousing for the good before they can be shipped to the NGO. These warehousing costs (and 
the potential cost of securing the goods) are currently not accounted for in our model and, hence, 
might significantly influence the final outcome of the scenarios.  
While we focus on cost efficiency in this study, effectiveness is often seen as a more 
important performance measure than efficiency for emergency food aid supply chains. We think 
that both are important in the delivery of aid. Lack of effectiveness will result in sub-optimal aid 
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for a region while a lack of efficiency results in fewer goods delivered to affected areas. Looking 
at potential trade-offs between effectiveness and efficiency is, hence, an area of future research. 
This study addresses the issue of governmental operations from a sourcing organization’s 
perspective. We compare RCA to DCA in the U.S. context and provide suggestions for the 
redesign of sourcing policies in relief supply chains without addressing issues in the final 
distribution of the aid through NGOs. Given that the majority of recipient countries have limited 
or nonexistent infrastructure, the final leg is often challenging and expensive, creating an 
opportunity for research in distribution of aid. 
We applied common TCE, RBV, and RDT theories to explain organizational behavior in 
governmental organizations and also recognize that other theories may also apply. While TCE 
and RDT have been applied to government activities and policies, there is a paucity of literature 
applying RBV. Further theoretical work is necessary to discover how existing theories can be 
applied to food relief agencies to explain and predict their behavior during relief projects.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31 
 
 
 
 
References 
Adugna, A. 2009. “How Much of Official Development Assistance is Earmarked?”, Worldbank 
CFP Working paper Series, Accessed on 12/11/2014: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/CFPEXT/Resources/CFP_Working_Paper_No2.pdf 
Arnold, U. 1999. "Organization of global sourcing: Ways towards an optimal degree of 
centralization", European Journal of Purchasing & Supply Management, 5(2):167-174. 
Atwood, J. B., McPherson, M. P., & Natsios, A. (2008). Arrested Developments. Foreign 
Affairs, 2008(87): 6 
Bagchi, A., Paul, J. A., and Maloni, M. 2011. "Improving bid efficiency for humanitarian food 
aid procurement", International Journal of Production Economics, 134(1): 238-245. 
Balcik, B., Beamon, B. M., Krejci, C. C., Muramatsu, K. M., and Raminez, M. 2010. 
"Coordination in humanitarian relief chains: Practices, challenges and opportunities", 
International Journal of Production Economics, 126(1):22-34. 
Beamon, B. M., and Balcik, B. 2008. "Performance measurement in humanitarian relief chains", 
International Journal of Public Sector Management, 21(1): 4-25. 
Beresford, A. K. C., and Pettit, S. J. 2012. "Humanitarian Aid Logistics: The Wenchuan and 
Haiti Earthquakes Compared", In G. Kovács, and K. M. Spens (Eds.), Relief Supply 
Chain Management for Disasters: Humanitarian Aid and Emergency Logistics, 1st ed. 
Hershey, PA: IGI Global. 
Besiou, M., Pedraza-Martinez, A., and Van Wassenhove, L. N. 2012. "The Effect of Earmarked 
Funding on Fleet Management for Relief and Development", In INSEAD (Ed.), Faculty 
& Research: Working Paper: 36. Fontainebleau, France: INSEAD. 
Brause, J. C. 2009. "International Food Assistance: Local and Regional Procurement Can 
Enhance the Efficiency of U.S. Food Aid But Challenges May Constrain Its 
Implementation", Accessed on 12/12/2014. Available at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/300/290226.pdf 
BTS 2014. "Bureau of Transportation Stastics, U.S. International Trade and Freight 
Transportation Report",  Accessed on 12/11/2014. Available at 
https://2bts.rita.dot.gov/pdc/user/products/src/products.xml?p=558&c=-1 
Care 2006. "White Paper on Food Aid Policy", Merrifield, VA: CARE USA. 
Carney, J. 2012. "$4 for a Can of Coke? Price Gouging Hits New Level", In CNBC (Ed.): Yahoo 
Finance. 
Coase R.H. 1988. "The Nature of the Firm: Influence," Journal of Law, Economics, & 
Organization, 4(1): 33-47.  
Congress 2014.  "H.R. 4005 - Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2014", Accessed 
on 12/12/2014. Available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-
bill/4005 
Conner, K.R., and Prahalad, C.K. 1996. "A Resource-Based Theory of the Firm: Knowledge 
versus Opportunism", Organization Science, 7(5):477–501. 
Crocker, K., and Masten, S. 1996." Regulation and administered contracts revisited: Lessons 
from Transaction Cost Economics for Public Utility Regulation", Journal of Regulatory 
Economics, 9( i.1):5-39. 
32 
 
 
 
 
Day, J. M., Melnyk, S. A., Larson, P. D., Davis, E. W., and Whybark, D. C. 2012. "Humanitarian 
and Disaster Relief Supply Chains: A Matter of Life and Death", Journal of Supply Chain 
Management, 48(2): 21-36. 
Defee, C., Williams, B., Randall, W.S., Thomas, R. 2010. "An inventory of theory in logistics 
and SCM research", International Journal of Logistics Management, 21(3):404 - 489. 
Falasca, M., and Zobel, C. W. 2011. "A two-stage procurement model for humanitarian relief 
supply chains". Journal of Humanitarian Logistics and Supply Chain Management, 1(2): 
151-169. 
FAO 2013. "The State of Food Insecurity in the World, 2013 Report", Accessed on 12/11/2014 
Available at: http://www.fao.org/docrep/018/i3434e/i3434e.pdf 
FAOSTAT 2009. "Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations", In U. Nations 
(Ed.), Vol. 2009. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. 
Filipov, D., and Neuffer, E. 2001. "Puzzle and profits in the food drops", The Boston Globe 
10/25/2001. 
GAO 2007. "Foreign Assistance - Various Challenges Impede the Efficiency and Effectiveness 
of U.S. Food Aid", In U.S.G.A. Office (Ed.). Washington, DC: GAO. 
GAO 2009. "International Food Assistance - Local and Regional Procurement Can Enhance the 
Efficiency of U.S. Food Aid, but Challenges May Constrain Its Implementation", In GAO 
(Ed.). Washington, DC: GAO. 
Hoffman, W. L., Gardner, B. L., Just, R. E., and Hueth, B. M. 1994. "The Impact of Food Aid on 
Food Subsidies in Recipient Countries", American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 
76(4): 733-743. 
Kotabe, M., Martin, X., and Domoto, H. 2003. "Gaining from Vertical Parnerships: Knowledge 
Transfer, Relationship Duration, and Supplier Perforamnce Improvement in the U.S. and 
Japanese Automotive Industries", Strategic Management Journal, 24(4):293-316. 
Kovács, G., and Spens, K. M. 2007. "Humaniarian Logistics in Disaster Relief Operations", 
International Journal of Physical Distribution  and Logistics, 37(2): 99-114. 
Kovács, G., and Spens, K. M. 2011. "Humanitarian logistics and supply chain management: the 
start of a new journal", Journal of Humanitarian Logistics and Supply Chain 
Management, 1(1): 5-14. 
Kunz, N., and Reiner, G. 2012. "A meta-analysis of humanitarian logistics research", Journal of 
Humanitarian Logistics and Supply Chain Management, 2(2):116-147. 
McCleary, W. 1991. "The Earmarking of Government Revenue: A Review of Some World Bank 
Experience", The World Bank Observer, 6(1):81-104. 
Minear, L., and Weiss, T. G., 1992. "Groping and Coping in the Gulf Crisis: Discerning the 
Shape of a New Humanitarian Order", World Policy Journal, 9(4): 755-777. 
Oloruntoba, R., and Gray, R. 2006. "Humanitarian aid: an agile supply chain?", Supply Chain 
Management: An International Journal, 11(2):115-120. 
Peterson, K. 2014. "White House Warns Bill Would Crimp Foreign Food Aid", WSJ 4/24/2014 
Pfeffer, J. and Salancik G. R. 1978. The External Control of Organizations: A Resource 
Dependence Perspective, New York, NY, Harper and Row. 
Rienstra, D. 2004. "Success Out of Africa", International Trade Forum (4):35-38. 
33 
 
 
 
 
Shapouri, S., and Rosen, S. 2004. "Fifty years of US Food Aid and Its Role in Reducing World 
Hunger", Amber Waves - The Economics of Food, Farming, Natural Resources, and 
Rural America, 2(6), Washington, DC. 
Shelanski, H.A., and Klein, P.G. 1995. "Empirical Research in Transaction Cost Economics: a 
Review and Assessment", Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 335-361. 
Taupiac, C. 2001. “Humanitarian and development procurement: a vast and growing market”, 
International Trade Forum, 4:7-10. 
Tomasini, R. M., and Van Wassenhove, L.N. 2009. "From preparedness to partnerships: case 
study research on humanitarian logistics", International Transactions in Operational 
Research, 16:549-559 
Trautmann, G., Turkulainen, V., Hartmann, E., and Bals, L. 2009. "Integration in the Global 
Sourcing Organization - An Information Processing Perspective", A Global Review of 
Purchasing & Supply, 45(2):57-74. 
Trent, R. J., and Monczka, R. M. 2003."International Purchasing and Global Sourcing - What are 
the Differences?", Journal of Supply Chain Management, 39(4):26-37. 
Trestrail, J., Paul, J., and Maloni, M. 2009. "Improving bid pricing for humanitarian logistics", 
International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management, 39(5): 428-441. 
United Nations 2009." 2008 Annual Statistical Report on United Nations Procurement", Annual 
Statistical Report on United Nations Procurement. Copenhagen: UNOPS. 
USAID 2009."USAID History", Vol. 2009. Washington, DC: USAID. 
USAID/USDA 2012. "U.S. International Food Assistance Report", Accessed on 12/11/2014,  
Available at: http://www.fas.usda.gov/sites/default/files/2014-07/usda-
usaid_fy2012_food_assistance_report.pdf  
USAID 2012. "Fact Sheet: EFSA", Accessed on 12/11/2014, http://www.usaid.gov/what-we-
do/agriculture-and-food-security/food-assistance/programs/emergency-programs   
USAID 2015. "Food Aid Reform", Accessed on 12/12/2014:http:/www.usaid.gov/foodaidreform 
Van Wassenhove, L. N. 2006. "Humanitarian Aid Logistics: Supply Chain Management in High 
Gear", Journal of the Operational Research Society, 57:475-498. 
Voss, R. 2009. “Barriers to recipient country ownership of U.S. food aid: congressional 
earmarks, set asides, and the impact of special interests on food security assistance”, 
Honors in international studies capstone, American University, Accessed on 12/12/2014. 
http://aladinrc.wrlc.org/handle/1961/9438?show=full  
Walker, D. 2004."A Longer Term Perspective on Ocean Transportation", MI Prospect, 7:HGCA. 
Wernerfelt, B.1984. "A resource-based view of the firm", Strategic Management Journal,  
5(i2):171-180. 
WFP 2006. "World Food Program", In WPF (Ed.), Vol. 2006 
Williamson, O.E. 1998. "Transaction Cost Economics: How It Works; Where It is Headed?", De 
Economist, 146( i1): 23-58. 
Yu, D., Yalcin M.G., Ozpolat, K., and Hales, D. 2014. “URI working paper series”, Accessed 
on: 12/12/2014, http://www.cba.uri.edu/research/workingpapers/  
 
 
 
 
34 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
